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RESERVED WATER RIGHTS AND
OUR NATIONAL FORESTS

WATER LAW-WINTERS DOCTRINE: National forests have reserved water rights only for the purposes of furnishing a continuous
supply of timber and for securing favorable water flows. United
States v. New Mexico, 98 S.Ct. 3012 (1978).

The case of United States v. New Mexico," decided in July of
1978, is the most recent modification by the United States Supreme
Court of the so-called "Winters Doctrine." This doctrine provides that
federally reserved lands have sufficient accompanying water rights to
accomplish the purpose for which the lands were reserved. 2 United
States v. New Mexico clarified the doctrine somewhat by holding
that the Gila National Forest located in southwestern New Mexico
has reserved water rights only for the primary purposes for which the
national forest was established, but not for any secondary purposes.
The result is that the potential scope of the Winters Doctrine, as it
applies to national forest lands, has been significantly narrowed.
National forests now have reserved rights only for furnishing a continuous supply of timber and for securing favorable water flows-the
two purposes the Court recognized as primary,
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The Winters Doctrine is a judicially created one.' There are few
cases dealing directly with the issue and unfortunately these cases
have left the doctrine with many of its contours unspecified. The
following is a brief synopsis of its history and a description of the
doctrine as it was at the time of United States v. New Mexico. 4
The Winters Doctrine was foreshadowed by the Supreme Court in
the 1899 case of United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation
1. 98 S.Ct. 3012 (1978).
2. 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
3. Ranquist, The Winters Doctrine and How It Grew: FederalReserved Rights to the Use
f Water 1975 B.Y.U. L. REV. 648 (1975).
4. More thorough treatments of the history of the Winters Doctrine can be found in F.
rRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW 104 (1971), Comment,
7ederal Reserved Rights in Water: The Problem of Quantification 9 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
39 (1977); Ranquist, supra note 3, as well as many others. The Winters Doctrine does not
ack scholarly attention.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 19

Company.S In this case the Court held that a state cannot destroy
the right of the United States, as owner of lands bordering a stream,
to the continued flow of the stream's waters as may be necessary for
the beneficial uses of the government property.
The first real articulation of the Winters Doctrine came in its
namesake, Winters v. United States,6 a 1908 decision in which the
Supreme Court held that the Indians on the Fort Belknap Reservation of Montana were entitled to reserved water rights in the Milk
River.7 For 47 years, the Winters Doctrine remained applicable only
to Indian reservations. Then in 1955 in Federal Power Commission
v. Oregon8 the Supreme Court appeared to extend the doctrine to
non-Indian federal enclaves by declaring that any lands that had been
federally withdrawn from the public domain were not subject to
state water law. 9
The Supreme Court more clearly expanded the doctrine in the
1963 case of Arizona v. California.1I The Court granted reserved
water rights to the Indians of the Colorado Indian Reservation. It
reasoned, as it had in Winters, that the reservation would be essentially useless without water and that therefore Congress must have
intended to reserve sufficient water for the Indians' needs when it
created the reservation.' 1 The Court went on to say that similarly
the United States intended to reserve water rights for other federal
5. 174 U.S. 680 (1899).
6. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
7. The Court found an implied reservation of water rights but did not make clear
whether the Indians reserved the rights as aboriginal rights or whether the U.S. reserved the
rights for the benefit of the Indians when it created the reservation. In either case the Court
treated the priority date as 1888, the date of the creation of the reservation, and held that
Indian rights to the use of water, even if not exercised, were superior to non-Indian appropriations made subsequent to the 1888 priority date.
8. 349 U.S. 435 (1955).
9. In California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
163-164 (1935) the Court, in construing the Acts of 1866 (43 U.S.C. §661 (1976)), 1870
(43 U.S.C. §661 (1976)), and 1877 (43 U.S.C. 321 (1976)) held that "following the act of
1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became
publicijuris subject to the plenary control of the designated states... In F.P.C. v. Oregon,
349 U.S. 435 (1955), the Court removed the states' control over the water rights of federal
reservations by declaring that those reservations were not a part of the "public domain."
There remains the troublesome question of how the federal government could reserve rights
that it had previously relinquished. The Supreme Court has stated the basis of the power as
either the Property Clause or the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, but there are
theoretical problems with both of these. The answer may lie in the Supremacy Clause. See
F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW, 147 (1971).
10. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
11. This was the first quantification of Winters Doctrine rights. The Court accepted th
Master's finding that "the water was intended to satisfy the future as well as the presen
needs of the Indian Reservation" and that "enough water was reserved to irrigate all th
practicably irrigable acreage on the reservation." 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963).
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establishments such as national recreation areas and national
forests.' 2 In discussing its Arizona v. California decision the
Supreme Court, in the 1971 case of United States v. District Court in
and for the County of Eagle,' ' stated that federal lands for which
water may be reserved include any federal enclave. The Court expressed its guiding limitation on the doctrine in the recent case of
Cappaert v. United States' 4 when it stated: "the implied-reservationof-water-rights doctrine, however, reserves only that amount of water
necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more."' '
A succinct description of the Winters Doctrine as developed up to
this point was written in 1971 by Frank J. Trelease as follows:
If the United States by treaty, act of Congress or executive order
reserves a portion of the public domain for a federal purpose which
will ultimately require water, and at the same time the government
intends to reserve unappropriated water for that purpose., then sufficient water to fulfill that purpose is reserved from appropriation by
private users. The effect of the doctrine is twofold: 1) when water is
eventually put to use the right of the United States will be superior
to private rights in the source of water acquired after the date of the
reservation, hence such private rights may be impaired or destroyed
without compensation by the exercise of the reserved rights, and 2)
the federal use is not subject to state laws regulating the appropriation and use of water.' 6
There are other significant problems with the Winters Doctrine,
the most serious of which are that the reserved water rights are
undetermined in quantity and may be exercised at any time. As
Trelease puts it: "They are wild cards that may be played at any
time, blank checks that may be filled in for any amount or may never
be cashed."' I Knowledge of this risk deters private investment and
development which would require water in areas near federal enclaves, for this water is in danger of being claimed without compensation at some time in the future by a federal reservation. Additionally,
states cannot be sure of how much water is available to be allocated
under state law. These problems exist with the reserved water rights
of all federal reservations. But because United States v. New Mexico
deals only with the Gila National Forest, this discussion will be
limited to the reserved water rights of national forests.
12. 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

401 U.S. 521, 522-523 (1971).
426 U.S. 128 (1976).
Id. at 141.
F. TRELEASE, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW, 109 (1971).
Id. at 160.
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The potential importance of the national forests' reserved rights is
demonstrated by the fact that federal lands provide 61% of the total
natural runoff in the eleven coterminous western states, and 88% of
that runoff comes from Forest Service land.' 8 Given that in the arid
Southwest almost all available water is already appropriated, a
superior national forest claim to water originating on its lands would
necessarily mean deprivation to other users.
The essential question is this: what is the maximum water right
that the national forests are entitled to claim under the Winters
Doctrine? Previous to United States v. New Mexico the only guideline was that national forests were entitled to enough water to fulfill
the purposes for which they were created.1 9 Those purposes could
conceivably have included recreation, such as maintaining ski areas,
lakes, camping and fishing areas, stockwatering and preservation of
wilderness, as well as the more basic purposes of furnishing timber
and securing favorable water flows.'

'

Although water use in the past

by the national forests has been relatively small,2 I resulting in few
actual conflicts with other right holders, the potential water requirement, including that of national forest permittees whose purposes fit
within those described above, could be far greater. The effects of
United States v. New Mexico on this potential conflict between
federal reserved rights and state granted rights will be analyzed following a discussion of the decision itself.
UNITED STATES v. NEW MEXICO
This suit was initiated in 1966 in a New Mexico district court as a
private action to enjoin allegedly illegal diversions from the Rio
18. U.S. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE
NATION'S LAND, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO CONGRESS, 140 (1970).
19. In Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), the Special Master quantified the
water rights of two of the four non-Indian federal reservations involved by adopting the
U.S.'s suggested quantities, which the Master found reasonable, but left undetermined the
rights of the others, one of which was the Gila National Forest, i.e. the reservation at issue
in United States v. New Mexico. The Master found that the Gila had reserved rights to the
water necessary to fulfill the purposes for which the forest was created. Report of the
Special Master, 297-300, 335.
20. The Organic Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. §475 (1976) states that, "No national
forest shall be established, except to improve and protect the forest within the boundaries,
or for the purpose of securing favorable water flows and to furnish a continuous supply of
timber..." The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §528 (1976) provides, "That it is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are established and shall
be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed and wildlife and fish
purposes."
21. Brief for Petitioner at 57, United States v. New Mexico, 98 S.Ct. 3012 (1978)
Reply Brief at 9, Corker, Federal-StateRelations in Water Rights Adjudication and Administration 17 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 579, 584 (1972).
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Mimbres which flows through southwestern New Mexico. In 1970
the State of New Mexico filed a complaint in intervention seeking a
general statutory adjudication of the water rights on the Rio
Mimbres. 2 2 The state's motion to intervene was granted and the suit
proceeded as a general adjudication of all the water rights on the
stream system. The Complaint in Intervention named as defendants
all known claimants to the stream's water system, including the
United States, which was joined pursuant to the McCarran Amendment. 2"
The United States claimed water rights under the Winters Doctrine
for minimum instream flows, fish purposes, stockwatering and
recreation, as well as to insure favorable conditions of water flows
and to furnish a continuous supply of timber.2 4 Most of these claims
were supported by the Special Master's findings.2 However, the
district court did not agree with the Special Master. It held that the
United States, in setting aside the Gila National Forest from other
public lands, reserved the use of such waters as may be necessary for
the limited purposes for which the land was reserved and that these
purposes did not include recreation, aesthetics, wildlife preservation
or cattle grazing. 2 6 The district court concluded that the United
States did not have a reserved right to a minimum instream flow
based on any of the purposes for which the Gila National Forest was
established and that any water rights arising from cattle grazing by
permittees of the federal government should be adjudicated under
state law.2 7 The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the decision
29
of the district court,2 8 as did the United States Supreme Court.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court soundly reaffirmed the Winters Doctrine. It was undisputed among the parties
involved and the Court that there had been implied reservations of
water in 1899, 1905, 1908 and 1910 when areas for the Gila
National Forests were withdrawn from the public domain through
Presidential proclamations authorized by the Organic Administration
Act of 1897.11 The only disputed issue was the quantity of the
water right reserved, which depended on the purposes for which the
Gila was created.
22. Pursuant to N.M. STAT. ANN. §75-4-4 (1953),
§72-4-15 (1978).
23. 43 U.S.C. §666(a) (1976).
24. 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977).
25. Id. at 616.
26. 98 S.Ct. 3012 (1978) page 2 of opinion.
27. Supra note 24, at 616, 619.
28. Id.
29. 98 S.Ct. 3012 (1978).
30. 16 U.S.C. §473 et seq. (1976).

currently N.M.

STAT. ANN.
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The United States' first argument was that the issue had already
been decided in the case of Arizona v. Colorado.3 1 It claimed that in
that case the Court adopted the Special Master's opinion which listed
all the uses for which water is now being claimed as valid purposes of
the national forest. New Mexico denied this and argued instead that
the Special Master never reached any conclusion as to the purposes
for which the Gila National Forest could have been created. 3 2
The primary controversy in the instant case centered around the
parties divergent interpretations of those purposes as found in the
Organic Administration Act (Organic Act) and the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.' ' Referring to extensive legislative
history, New Mexico contended that the Organic Act established
only two limited purposes for which national forests could be
created. According to New Mexico the Organic Act authorized withdrawal of lands to improve and protect the forest in order 1) to
insure favorable conditions of water flows and 2) to furnish a continuous supply of timber.3 4 This reading of the Organic Act would
exclude the possibility of a reserved water right for fish purposes,
wildlife preservation, aesthetics, recreation or stockwatering. New
Mexico also argued that while the Organic Act might entitle the
United States to a reserved right to minimum instream flows for
securing favorable water flows and providing a continuous supply of
timber, the United States had not demonstrated a need for such a
right.3 ' New Mexico reasoned that any other instream use for which
the United States claimed a reserved right, such as for fish or wildlife
protection, is not only not provided for in the Organic Act, but
would be contrary to the Organic Act's historic purpose of securing
favorable water flows for the benefit of private appropriators.' 6
The United States read the Organic Act as establishing three
rather than two purposes: 1) to improve and protect the forest; 2)
to secure favorable water flows; and 3) to furnish a continuous
supply of timber.' 7 Within the purpose of improving and protecting
the forest would necessarily be implied a right to instream flows for
fire prevention and erosion control.3 I If "forest" were defined
31. Brief for Petitioner at 11, 17, United States v. New Mexico 98 S.Ct. 3012 (1978)
(hereinafter Petitioner's Brief).
32. Brief for Respondent at 20, United States v. New Mexico 98 S.Ct. 3012 (1978)
(hereinafter Respondent's Brief).
33. Supra note 19.
34. Respondent's Brief at 23. The Court in its opinion did not deal with this issue. If
collateral estoppel had been a valid issue then, of course, discussion of all other issues would
have been foreclosed.
35. Id. at 4 8.
36. Id. at 52.
37. Petititioner's Brief at 12.
38. Id. at 22.
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broadly, as was urged by the United States, improving and protecting
the forest could also include a right to instream flows for conservation of fish, game and plantlife.3 9 The United States further claimed
that the maintenance of a minimum instream flow is necessary to
accomplish the purpose of securing favorable water flows.4 0
Recreation and grazing were asserted by the United States as
secondary purposes for which national forests could be created. In
support of this claim the United States relied on legislative history
of the Organic Act, the language of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield
Act, and the administrative policy of treating these as valid purposes
of the national forests. 4" The Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act was
claimed to be a congressional recognition of the traditional use of the
national forests for recreation and other purposes. 4
New Mexico responded to this argument by pointing out that the
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act did not repeal the Organic Act. Its
express terms were supplemental to and not in derrogation of the
Organic Act. 4 In other words the basic purposes for which the
national forests could be created had not changed with the passage of
the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act. Congress was merely expressing by its enactment its intent that the forests be administered
under the principle of multiple use. 4 ' New Mexico concluded that
congressionally recognized uses of national forests were expanded
under the Act, not the purposes for which they were established.4
Even if the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act did expand these
purposes, it could not operate retroactively. Since the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act did not exist at the time of the formation of the
Gila National Forest, the Organic Act would be determinative of the
purposes for which it could have been created. The secondary purposes which the United States referred to were not included in the
express terms of the Organic Act, and in fact, argued New Mexico,
were specifically excluded.4 6
The United States further claimed that grazing has always been
recognized as a purpose of the Gila National Forest 4 and that denial
of a water right for grazing purposes would interfere with a longstanding federal practice of range management administered through
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 43-56.
Id. at 53.
Respondent's Brief at 80.
Id at 82.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 79-82.
Petitioner's Brief at 59.
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a federal permit system. 4
It was argued that requiring federal
permittees to acquire individual water rights to water used by their
stock would place an unreasonable burden on federal range management. 4 9 In response to this argument New Mexico indicated in a
Proposed Order Modifying the Master's Report that it would be
willing to adjudicate all such rights jointly and severally to the
United States and the permittees, assigning a single priority date of
1907 to all of them.5 0
In its opinion,'
the Supreme Court recognized that the United
States had the power to reserve water rights for federal enclaves and
stressed that the issue here was one of implied intent and not power.
It emphasized that its policy is to acknowledge reserved rights only
to the extent necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, and
no more. Where water is necessary to fulfill the purposes for which a
reservation was created, the Court reasoned, the United States must
have intended to reserve the necessary water. Conversely, where
water is valuable only for a secondary use of the reservation, Congress intended that the United States should acquire water under
state law. The Court supported this conclusion by citing to congressional appropriations for the acquisition under state law of water to
be used on federal reservations and to the policy of the Forest Service, until recently, of acquiring water rights under state law
wherever possible. In weighing factors relevant to its decision, the
Court recognized that in water short states like New Mexico the
exercise of a federal reserved right will inevitably cause a corresponding reduction in the amount of water available to other users.
Turning to the issue of congressional intent in authorizing the
creation of the national forests, the Court on examining the legislative history of the Creative Act' 2 and the Organic Administration
Act,' ' found that there were only two purposes for which national
forests could be established: 1) to conserve water flows and 2) to
furnish a continuous supply of timber. The Court compared the
language of Congress in establishing national parks and fish and game
preserves with that used in establishing national forests. It concluded
that if Congress had intended for national forests to be established
for any other purposes it would have so specified, as it did in the
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id. at 60.
50. Proposed Order Modifying the Master's Report 3-4.
51. This section is a summary of the opinion of the United States Supreme Court found
at 98 S.Ct. (1978). Individual page citations have been omitted.
52. 16 U.S.C. §473 (1976).
53. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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legislation which authorized the creation of national parks and fish
and game preserves. Similarly, the Court reasoned that if Congress
had intended to reserve minimum instream flows it would have expressly directed such a reservation, as it did for the Lake Superior
5
National Forest .
The Court pointed out that one of the primary concerns of Congress in creating the national forests was to enhance the quality and
supply of water that would be available to settlers of the arid West.
The Court concluded that the claim of the United States of reserved
rights for recreation and wildlife preservation could not be sustained
because it would defeat this purpose.
On the issue of the effect of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act,
the Court again agreed with the lower court decision and the claims
of the State of New Mexico. The Court held that the Act has neither
a retroactive effect nor does it expand the reserved rights of the
United States. Even though Congress intended the national forests
to be administered for broader purposes after the Act, the Court saw
no indication that Congress believed the new purposes to be so
crucial as to require a reservation of additional water. However, the
Court reserved judgment on the issue of whether a national forest
created after the passage of the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act
would have such expanded reserved water rights.
Lastly, as to the issue of whether there exist reserved rights for
stockwatering, the Court examined the legislative histories of the
forest acts and determined that Congress did not foresee any need
for the Forest Service to allocate water for stockwatering. The Court
found therefore that there are no reserved rights for this purpose
and affirmed the lower court holding that these rights must be acquired under state law.
The four Justice dissent differed from the majority on two
points. The first was in the interpretation of the purposes for the
creation of national forests as outlined in the Organic Act. The
dissent took the view of the United States that there are three purposes, not just two, and that the first one, to improve and protect
the forest, implies a reserved right sufficient to sustain the wildlife of
the forests. Secondly, the dissent saw no inconsistency with the purposes of the Organic Act in holding that there is a reserved right to
instream flows because the instream use is not a consumptive use and
would not deprive other users (at least other downstream users) of
any water. The dissent noted however that the Court's opinion does
54. 16 U.S.C. §577b (1976).

442
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not bar the United States from asserting a reserved right to instream
flows for erosion control or fire protection based on the recognized
purposes of watershed management and the maintenance of timber.
CONCLUSION
The most obvious outcome of the Supreme Court's decision is that
the quantity of reserved rights which may be claimed by the federal
government for national forests is reduced to that necessary to fulfill
the primary purposes for which the forests were created. Those purposes are to secure favorable water flows and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber. Although the amount of water which can be
claimed is diminished significantly from what might have previously
been claimed, the exact quantity of the reserved right is still undetermined. Thus, the problems mentioned previously which stem from
this uncertainty still exist, just to a lesser degree. It is possible that
included in the amounts for the purposes mentioned above the
United States may be able to claim a reserved right to instream flows
for erosion control and fire protection, as was suggested by the
dissent.
Another result of the United States v. New Mexico holding is that
water for purposes other than those stated above must be obtained
by the United States from the state or through the power of eminent
domain. The problem with obtaining water rights from the state is
that the Forest Service's desired use might not constitute a recognized beneficial use under state law and would therefore not give rise
to a valid water right." s Additionally, the priority date of such a
right would be junior to all other rights acquired before it. This
decision causes the United States to lose the priority date that it
thought it had, or at least it claimed it had, for those rights.
If the federal government chooses to exercise its alternative
option, that of acquiring rights through eminent domain, it would
have to compensate all right holders deprived of their rights as a
result. 6
The third effect of the Court's decision is that all future permittees of the national forests will be required to adjudicate their
rights according to state law. It is possible that all present permittees'
rights would be grandfathered s ' and only subsequent users of such
water would have to acquire state water rights.
55. 16 NAT. RES. J. 975, 987 (1976).
56. F. TRELEASE, supra note 15, at 147m.
57. Proposed Order Modifying the Master's Report 3-4, 16 NAT. RES. J. 975, 994, 995

(1976).
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Fourthly, the Supreme Court's strict construction of the purposes
for which national forests were created may be indicative of a new
attitude toward the Winters Doctrine. It is possible that the Court
will construe the purposes for which other federal enclaves were
created in a similar manner. This would result in a far reaching curtailment of the potential scope of the Winters Doctrine.
On the other hand, each type of federal reservation is unique. The
national forests are created for relatively limited purposes; they are
an uncomplicated type of reservation when compared with some
other federal reservations. For example, Indian reservations involve
human needs for water, governmental treaty obligations, and perhaps
even moral considerations. For this reason, any predictions based on
United States v. New Mexico as to future Supreme Court decisions
regarding reserved water rights of other federal enclaves would be
highly speculative.
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